“So he (Yaakov) blessed them (Ephraim and Menashe)
that day, saying, ‘( Becha yevaraych Yisrael )
By you shall [Bnei] Yisrael bless saying, ‘May Hashem
make you like
Ephraim and Menashe' – and he put Ephraim before Menashe.” Vayechi
48:20.
Rashi explains that Yaakov Avinu
blessed Ephraim and Menashe that when a father will
desire to bless his son, he will bless him that Hashem
should make him like Ephraim and Menashe. How is
this a beracha to Menashe and Ephraim? Generally,
a “blesser” blesses
a “blessee” that he should be granted an increase in
some capacity, be it in health, wealth, children, intellectual
capabilities, etc. Here, however, Yaakov Avinu's beracha
appears to merely affirm Ephraim and Menashe's achievements
thus far, deeming these accomplishments worthy of emulation
by the children of the Bnei Yisrael.
A further question involves the
phrase, “and he put
Ephraim before Menashe.” Rashi explains that the Torah
articulates the seemingly obvious fact that Yaakov
Avinu placed Ephraim before Menashe in his beracha
to show that the tribe of Ephraim's banner should precede
that of Menashe's tribe in their encampment in the
desert and that the korbanos of the prince of Ephraim's
tribe which were offered during the inauguration of
the Mishkan should precede those that were offered
by the prince of Menashe's tribe. Why is this sequence
relevant to the beracha of Yaakov Avinu?
An understanding of the nature of the banners of the
tribes and the korbanos that were offered by their
princes during the inauguration of the Mishkan can
shed light on these questions. The Midrash says that
Hashem displayed an abundance of love to the Bnei Yisrael
by making for them banners so that each tribe has individual
recognition. What is this individual recognition that
the Midrash speaks of? The banners served as a guide
to each individual tribe, directing each tribe in its
unique mission of serving Hashem. Additionally, they
gave recognition to the distinctive nature of each
tribe's individual contribution to Bnei Yisrael's collective
service of Hashem in that a given tribe's service could
not be substituted by another tribe's service.
The importance of the individual tribes is also highlighted
during the discussion of the korbanos that were offered
by the princes of the tribes during the inauguration
of the Mishkan. The Ramban notes that the Torah first
details each korban of the different princes and then
reviews the sum total of what was brought by the various
princes to show that although each of the korbanos
were identical to each other, each offering was important
to and equally valued by Hashem.
This concept of the value and significance of the
individual can perhaps shed light on the significance
of Yaakov Avinu placing Ephraim before Menashe. Had
Yaakov Avinu placed Menashe first, it would have been
explained that he did so because Menashe was older.
By switching the order in his beracha, however, Yaakov
Avinu emphasized the unique missions of Ephraim and
Menashe which were consistent with their individual
strengths, and blessed them that each one should continue
to carry out his special duty and that each one's individual
contribution would be of equal value to Hashem.
Having different individual missions,
however, leads to the risk of a weakening of the
strong bond shared by brothers. Therefore, Yaakov
Avinu used “ Becha ” the
singular form of “By you,” blessing Ephraim and Menashe
with unity in the face of their individual missions
and approaches in their service to Hashem. This unity,
as well as having a unique mission and approach in
serving Hashem, Yaakov Avinu declared would be the
beracha with which Bnei Yisrael would bless their children.
May Hashem grant us the cognizance to know our unique
mission in serving Him and yet remain united so that
He can derive from us a true sense of nachas ruach.
Rabbi
Liberman, an alumnus of the Kollel, learns daily in the Kollel
Boker program. He is a former coordinator of the Parsha Encounters
publication.
Halacha Encounters
License To Lie
Rabbi Moshe Menachem Liberman
“And they sent a message to Yoseph saying: Your father commanded
before he died, saying: So you shall say to Yoseph: Please
forgive now the transgression of your brethren, and their
sin, for they did to you evil . . .” Vayechi 50:16-17.
Rashi points out that the brothers
modified the words of Yaakov Avinu in this matter in
the interest of peace because Yaakov Avinu had not actually
commanded thus.1 The Gemara learns from
these pesukim that there is a license to alter the truth
in the interest of peace.2 This freedom
to alter the truth is actually mandatory and not merely
an authorization to alter the truth.3 Before
we look at this obligation to alter the truth in the
interest of peace, it behooves us to examine the general
restriction against altering it.
The Torah states in Parshas Mishpatim, “From
a false matter you shall distance yourself.”4 Thus,
halachic authorities hold that there is a biblical obligation
to refrain from lying.5 Furthermore,
Hashem exhorts us to speak the truth, as the Navi in
Zechariah states, “Let one man speak with another in
truth.”6
The threshold for establishing what
constitutes a falsehood, though, is very low. A
mere omission is considered an alteration of the truth.7 The
Chofetz Chaim deduces this from the Talmud in Yevamos
65b which states:
Peace is important because even Hakodosh
Boruch Hu altered the truth in the interest of peace. Initially
the Torah writes [that Sarah Imeinu, after hearing that
she will give birth to a son to Avraham Avinu, said], “[After
I am old shall my skin become smooth] and my husband
is old?”8 And afterwards it writes [Hashem
(only) told Avraham Avinu that Sarah Imeinu had said], “and
I am old?”9
The only difference between what Sarah Imeinu said and what
Hashem told Avraham Avinu that she said, was that Hashem
omitted the comment that she had made concerning Avraham
Avinu.10 This omission, the Gemara said,
was permitted only because it was done in the interest
of peace.11 Thus, even a mere omission
of part of an otherwise true statement is considered
a falsehood to which we are commanded to keep our distance.12
Although merely omitting is considered
a falsehood, when altering the truth in the interest
of peace, it is preferred to an outright lie.13 Of
course, if merely omitting would be insufficient then
he should outright lie.14 This obligation
to lie in the interest of peace, however, does not sanction
swearing falsely.15 Additionally, one
may not lie concerning things which have not yet happened.16
There are other times when it is
also appropriate to lie. If a person is asked whether
he is knowledgeable in a certain Mesechta, he may lie
and answer that he is not when in fact he is.17 However,
if he is asked in order to provide an answer to a halachic
query or to teach, then he must answer truthfully, consistent
with his expertise in the Mesechta.18
If a person is asked in the presence
of disreputable people concerning the graciousness of
his host, he may lie and answer that his host was not
gracious.19
The contemporary halachic authorities
also permit altering the truth in the following circumstances:
¨ People
may answer, “I don't know” when asked about a matter
that is supposed to remain secret.20
¨ Wealthy
individuals may lie about their wealth if they fear “the
evil eye” (ayin hara) or if they do not want to
arouse jealousy.21
¨ If
one fears that a package will be mishandled, it is permitted
to write “glass” on it, even though it does not contain
any glass.22
______________________________
1 Rashi al Hatorah, Vayechi
50:16 (beginning with the words “Your father commanded”)
2 Yevamos 65b
3 Derishah al Choshen
Mishpat 262:21
4 23:7.
5 Rabbi Shmuel Hominer, Eved
HaMelech, Parshas Mishpatim 23:7:1 (citing SMa”G
at Esay 107 and SMa”K 226) (4th ed. 1998); but see Rabbi
Menachem Trivash, Orach Maysharim 9:1:1
(noting that this verse is only a restriction on judges
and witnesses in the judicial context) (3d ed. 1968).
6 Mesilas Yesharim
Chapter 11 (quoting Zechariah 8:16 and other sources).
7 Chofetz Chaim Hilchos
Rechilus 1:8:14.
8 Vayera 18:12.
9 Id. at 18:13.
10 Chofetz Chaim Hilchos
Rechilus 1:8:14.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Chofetz Chaim Hilchos
Rechilus 1:8.
14 Id.
15 Id.; but
see Chofetz Chaim Hilchos Rechilus 1:8:15 (noting
that if there is a foreseeable loss to the other person
it is questionable whether swearing falsely may be
permitted).
16 Magen Avraham 156:2
(citing Sefer Chasidim 426); but see Mishnah Berurah
156:4 (commenting on Magen Avraham 156:2 that it is questionable); see Rabbi
Shmuel Hominer, Eved HaMelech, Parshas Mishpatim
23:7:2 (explaining that the Mishnah Berurah does not
understand why there should be a limitation as to when
one may alter the truth in the interest of peace).
17 Shulchan Aruch
Choshen Mishpat 262:21.
18 Be'er HaGolah al
Choshen Mishpat 262:9.
19 Shulchan Aruch
Choshen Mishpat 262:21.
20 Rabbi Doniel Yehuda
Neustadt, The Weekly Halachic Discussion, 47 (citing Titen
Emes l'Yaakov at 76 (quoting Harav S.Z. Auerbach
and Harav S.Y. Elyashiv)) (2d rev. ed. 2002).
21 Id. (citing Titen
Emes l'Yaakov at 78 (quoting Harav S.Y. Elyashiv)).
22 Id. at 48
(citing Titen Emes l'Yaakov at 66 (quoting Harav
S.Y. Elyashiv, Harav Y.Y. Fisher, and Harav C. Kanievsky)).